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Abstract—Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) has found
successful adoption in many applications. The deployment of CNN
on resource-constrained edge devices have proved challenging.
CNN distributed deployment across different edge devices has
been adopted. In this paper, we propose Trojan attacks on CNN
deployed across a distributed edge network across different nodes.
We propose five stealthy attack scenarios for distributed CNN
inference. These attacks are divided into trigger and payload
circuitry. These attacks are tested on deep learning models (LeNet,
AlexNet). The results show how the degree of vulnerability of in-
dividual layers and how critical they are to the final classification.
Keywords: Internet of Things, Security, Deep Learning,
Pipeline, Distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) edge devices used in conjunction
with Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) is increasingly
adopted in many applications such as smart homes, smart
cities, autonomous vehicles, and healthcare [1]. CNN inference
incurs large computation and memory overhead. To combat
this overhead, cloud-based CNN inference has been adopted,
but it raises security and privacy concerns [2] along with an
increase in communication latency [1]. To avoid this latency,
edge computing has been introduced where CNN inference can
be divided between resource-constrained node devices and edge
servers [3]. For some of the applications like smart homes and
community area networks (CAN) (see Fig. 1) there is a need
of exploring edge computing only using resource-constrained
node level edge devices (ND). We have seen in the past that
researchers have used mobile crowd computing (MCC) [4]
to collaborate for a task using a cluster of mobile devices.
Along the same lines recently, the idea of using multiple
resource constrained devices to implement distributed CNN has
been explored [5], [6]. The deployment of CNN on a locally
distributed edge network offers the advantage of higher privacy
and lower dependency on network bandwidth [5].
1) What is the Security Vulnerability in Distributed CNN:
Some of the attacks against CNN hardware accelerators dis-
cussed in literature includes: Liu et.al in [7] proposes a Trojan
attack on neural networks that generate samples of the input
from the weights of the pre-trained CNN model to form a
trigger circuit for a payload that induce malicious behavior
of the neurons of the CNN. Clements et.al [8] introduces a
framework carried CNN hardware accelerators where a specific
input image trigger perturbations that are added to targeted
Figure 1: Community Area Network
layers CNN to cause mis-classification in the final layer. These
above approaches assumes the attacker has knowledge of the
type of input image, full access to all the weights of the CNN
model, full information of the CNN architecture and can see the
direct consequence of the hardware attacks. This is not the case
with the distributed deployment and execution of CNN models
across multiple devices. Hence Distributed CNN is traditionally
considered more secure. One of the recent attacks [9] shows
that attacks on parameters of only one of the CNN layers can
lead to accuracy loss. Although their work requires resource-
intensive brute-force approach but it has a direct implication to
the security of distributed CNN on ND. With this intuition, we
analyzed LeNet [10] to see the effect of replacing the weights
of the first convolutional layer with a very small number. This
result showed us that such a replacement can cause a drastic
loss in accuracy. Hence, this observation warrants the following
research question to be answered Can an attacker utilize only
the information that one node has with respect to CNN to
launch a stealthy attack.
2) What are the Research Challenges: In this work, we argue
that such distributed designs are vulnerable to security attacks
as the case of distributing CNN to unknown parties may lead
to a compromised malicious node. The attacker has the hold of
ND only and in this distributed CNN the ND only has access to
weights associated with that layer, input features of the layer
and the output that it generates. Hence, it is challenging to
associate how to make use of only this information to generate
meaningful and stealthy attacks.
3) Novel Contributions: In this work our novel contributions
are as follows:
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Figure 2: CNN Layer Partitoning
• A layer by layer analysis to identify the most vulnerable
layer of the distributed CNN located in untrusted ND.
• We came up with a series of low overhead intermittent
attacks that can potentially lead to mis-classification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II provides some preliminary information on distributed CNN,
partitioning of the layers. Section III discusses the network
and threat model. Section IV describes the proposed attack
scenarios. Section V shows how to implement attack scenarios
stealthily. Section VI discusses the experimental setup. Section
VII provides the results and discussions. Section VIII discusses
the comparison with the state-of-the-art. Literature review is
provided in Section IX. Section X concludes the paper.
II. DISTRIBUTED CNN: PARTITIONING OF THE LAYERS
CNN architectures consist of convolutional, pooling, nor-
malization, non-linear activation, and fully connected layers.
Convolutional layers are the most computation-intensive while
the fully connected layers are more memory intensive compared
to other layers [5]. To achieve efficient distributed CNN infer-
ence on multiple resources constrained nodes, CNN has to be
partitioned based on the capabilities of the nodes involved in
the network. Several partitioning schemes have been adopted in
literature for optimum partitioning based on the computation,
memory, and communication (bandwidth) capabilities of the
nodes in the network [1], [5], [6], [11]. As is the case with any
implementation, our distributed CNN has some unique features,
though the overall idea is inspired by the above-mentioned ref-
erences. Fig. 2 shows an example case of our overall approach
for Layer-based partitioning. In Fig. 2 a CNN model (LeNet) is
considered, Conv1, Conv2, Conv3 represents three convolutions
layers and FC1, FC2 shows two fully connected layers. In case
1, it is shown that all the seven layers of CNN models are
undivided. Case 2 shows that since Conv1, and Pool1 require
the most computation hence the partitioning is done such that
they are allocated to one device and the rest of the network is
placed on the Device 2. Finally, in the third case, we further
sub-partitioned the layers in Device 2 into two devices. We
scaled our technique to other layers based on the computation
and memory requirement along with the total number of output
features each layer needs to transfer. Since this is not the core
of our work hence the details of partitioning are not further
discussed in this paper.
III. NETWORK AND THREAT MODEL
A. Network Model
The network model consists of IoT devices connected to-
gether forming a Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN). Each
IoT node device connected to its neighbor through wireless
communication technology [5]. Conceptual network topology
for CAN where the IoT node devices are connected together
is shown in Fig. 1. Multiple IoT devices collaborate to form
the WLAN (inspired from crowd-computing) of a locally dis-
tributed edge IoT-based network containing layers of a CNN to
perform classification. To perform classification on the locally
distributed network, the CNN layers are distributed across
different IoT node level edge devices (NDs) in the WLAN.
These IoT node devices may belong to different vendors and
may have different hardware & software characteristics.
B. Threat Model
In the threat model we assume these NDs may belong to
an attacker with malicious intentions. The attacker has no
knowledge of the full architecture of the CNN, input image to
the CNN and final classification. The attacker only has access
to the parameters deployed on a particular ND, and the input
features passed from previous ND for node-wise distributed
operation (to do part of the computation for distributed CNN)
to generate the output of the node-wise operation. Node-
wise operation may be convolution, pooling, normalization,
activation and/or classification depending on the parameters
deployed on the node.
IV. PROPOSED ATTACK SCENARIOS
In this section, the attacks that have been performed on
the CNN layer at the attacker node have been explained. As
elaborated earlier, after partitioning of the layers for distributed
CNN inference, the attacker node has access to the parameters
associated with its ND explained in Section III-B.
A. A Novice Scalar Attack
Since all the weights (parameters) follow Gaussian distri-
bution, therefore, hence multiplying each parameter with an
arbitrary scalar value will lead to a shift in the mean value of the
Gaussian Distribution to cause mis-classification. Bearing this
in mind in this attack, a scalar multiplication of all the weights
is applied, where scalar ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1.2, 1.4} ∀ xi ∈ X and X
is values of the parameters. The attacker’s intention is to reduce
Figure 3: Proposed Attack Scenarios
or increase the parameters by a certain percentage. In this work
four percentage values have been chosen, two to increase the
value of the parameter and two to decrease. Increment and
decrement in values are made up to 20% and 40%.
B. Random Scale Attack
In this attack, randomly chosen values are multiplied by the
values of the parameter. The random values that have been
chosen by the attacker are Gaussian distributed between 0 and
1.The rationale behind this attack is since it is computationally
and software-wise less intensive to introduce such attack even
on the fly. Further discussion is made on the overhead of such
an attack in the Section VII.
C. Polarity Switch Attack
In the polarity switch attack, the attacker flips all the signs
of the values of the parameters. Any value with a positive sign
has been switched to negative and all negative signs have been
switched to positive. In this attack, the attacker does not change
the values of the parameters, where flip = {-1} ∀ xi ∈ X and
X is values of the parameters.
D. Maximum Minimum Swap Attack
By maximum-minimum swap attack, we mean that the
attacker has changed the index of the maximum and minimum
values of the parameters. The attacker does not change the
statistical properties of the parameters’ matrix (i.e. the normal
distribution, the mean, the variance, stayed unchanged). Since
there is no heavy computation involved therefore this attack is
less on overhead and at the same time affects the accuracy.
E. Parameter Statistical Attack
The values of the parameters have a normal distribution of
X ∼ N (µ, σ2) , where X is values of the parameters.In this
attack, all the values of the parameters X have been changed by
the attacker with other new values X ′ that have the same normal
distribution property N (µ, σ2) . The new values have the same
mean µ and the same standard deviation σ2 like the original
values. This attack is heavy on memory but if a defender is
monitoring the parameters based on their statistical properties
then it is a very stealthy attack.
V. HOW TO IMPLEMENT ATTACK SCENARIOS STEALTHILY
The proposed methodology is shown in Fig. 3 depicts the
partitioning of a CNN on IoT edge devices in a CAN. In Fig.
3, the input images are collected and passed from Node 1 where
the first layer is situated to Node n where the final classification
layer is located. In the methodology, it is assumed that Node
1 and Node n are trusted nodes and intermediary nodes (Node
2 to Node n − 1) are untrusted nodes. In Fig. 3, Node 3 is
assumed to be an attacker with the malicious intent of causing
mis-classification at the final layer in Node n.
In Node 3, the attacker has access to the incoming input
feature maps which is the output of the prior node (Node 2).
The attacker has access to the trainable parameters (weights and
biases) deployed within the Node. The attack also has access
to the output feature maps at Node 3 which serves as input to
latter nodes (Node 4).
The attacks perpetrated in this work are divided into trigger
and payload circuits. The trigger can be used to activate
different payload circuits to implement the attack scenarios. The
trigger can be a software-based stimulus or hardware generated
signal.
A. Trigger Design
When the distributed CNN is established, it is presumed that
the information required for each ND is also provided. This
includes the information for the deployed layer’s parameters.
Based on this information, a malicious software code in the
processor can establish its triggering condition. Since the at-
tacker, ND has complete access to the given information and
the device hence it is feasible for the attacker to make this
trigger an intermittent one to make it more stealthy.
B. Payload Design
The payload circuit is activated by the trigger with the goal
of compromising the output feature maps at the node that serves
as input to the next node on the line of the network with
the objective of causing mis-classification at the final layer as
stealthily as possible. In this work, five payload mechanisms
are discussed to achieve the attacks discussed in Section IV.
For all the attacks where we need to multiply the parameters
with either a scalar number or random number, our methodol-
ogy used the following method. In order to reduce the timing
overhead, we implemented the attack using an additional buffer.
Once triggered this additional buffer sends out the corrupted
parameters instantly. Hence, we achieve reduced timing over-
head as shown in Section VII. In the attack where we required
swapping of the values, the maximum and minimum values of
the attack are swapped in place with the use of an intermediate
buffer. This attack only uses a comparator and does not require
heavy usage of multipliers.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we explain the experimental setup that has
been conducted to confirm the effectiveness of the proposed
methodology.
A. Device Type(s)
The experimental setup consists of Raspberry Pi 3 Model B.
Its specification is: 1) a CPU with a speed of 1.2GHz, 2) a RAM
of size 1GB, 3) a wireless LAN interface and a Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE) interface on the board, and 4) a fast Ethernet
interface (100 base-Ethernet) [12]. These devices have been
used because they are one of the most commonly used platforms
in modern IoT-based network experiments [13]–[15].
B. Communication setup
Each node connected to the other node using the Ethernet
interface (this can also be translated into the WiFi interface
as well). Each node has a unique IP address and a unique port
number for communication purposes. After processing the data,
each node sends the result, i.e. the blobs of the final layer to
the next node through the communication interface.
C. Experimental Scenarios
In the experiment, two CNN networks have been used to
show the effects of the attacks, namely, LeNet CNN [10] with
five layers (three convolutions and two fully connected) that has
been used for digit handwritten recognition, and AlexNet [16]
with eight layers (five convolutions and three fully connected)
for imageNet dataset [17] recognition. The CNN has been
partitioned and divided among the NDs, each ND gets a part
of the CNN that depends on its capability. The attacker node
has access to a subset of parameters i.e. to the parameters of
the layer that it receives. Then the attacker starts the attack by
manipulating the weights of the received layer. All the attacks
mentioned in Section IV have been implemented. Depending
on the type of attack, that attacker changes the weights of the
received layer, as shown in Fig. 3. Finally, the attacker receives
the data blobs (output of previous IoT ND), processes the data,
and then sends the new blobs (output feature) to the next IoT
ND.
VII. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Five different attacks on the values of the parameters of
a CNN layer have been proposed in this work. Each layer
of the CNN has parameters that are trained to perform high
accuracy classification on the input data. These layers can
be convolution layer or fully connected layer. Convolution
layers usually require high computation operation and a fully
connected layer requires high memory resources [18]. From
Figs. 4 and 5, it can be seen that some attack affects the
computation-centric layers, i.e., the convolution layer, other
attacks affect memory-centric layer, i.e., fully connected layer,
and some other attack affects both types of the layer equally.
The scalar attack results on LeNet CNN and AlexNet CNN
are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, respectively. It can be seen
from the figures that the scalar attack has more effect on
computation-centric layers, i.e., convolution layer. The scalar
value ∈ {0.6, 0.8, 1.2, 1.4} has an effect on the accuracy more
on the layers that are near the input data. From Figs. 4 and 5,
the accuracy is less at convolution 1 and 2 compare to layers
near to output of the network, i.e., the fully connected layer 1
and 2 for the scalar attack. The random attack is shown in Figs.
4 and 5 follows the scalar attack pattern but with more effect on
the accuracy. The layers near the input data, i.e., computation-
centric layers or the convolution layers affect the accuracy
more than the layers near the output of the CNN network, i.e.,
memory-centric layers or the fully connected layers.
On the other hand, the sign flipping attack has more effect
on the memory-centric layers, the fully connected layer. As
can be seen from Figs. 4 and 5, the accuracy at the layers
near the output of the network is almost zero, but with the
same attack on convolution layer 1 still, the network has around
40% accuracy. The swap attack, where the attacker swap the
index of the maximum and minimum values at the layer, has
more effect on the accuracy of the convolution layers. As each
convolution has multiple channels and each channel has it’s
maximum and minimum values. When the number of channels
increases the swap attack effect increases on the accuracy. The
fully connected layer has one matrix with one maximum and
one minimum value when the attacker swaps them, the accuracy
is not going to be affected much.
The parameter statistical attack affects all the layers equally.
Figs. 4 and 5 shows that the mean attack affects the accuracy
Figure 4: Comparison among all attacks on LeNet CNN
Figure 5: Comparison among all attacks on AlexNet CNN
of a small network like LeNet and big network like AlexNet
is less than 20% for all the layers. In Fig. 5, there is a data
outlier for swap attack at the convolution layer 5. The effect
of the attack on this layer is equivalent to convolution layer
1, where convolution layer 5 has more parameter and perform
more computational operation compare to layer 1. Tables I and
II summarize all the accuracy across all the layers for LeNet
and AlexNet network.
Tables III and IV summarize the overhead required by
the attacker to change the values of the parameters. As the
number of parameter increases the time needed by the attacker
increases, for example, convolution layer 3 and fully connected
layer 6 in AlexNet has higher parameter compared to other
layers. Also, for LeNet the convolution layer 3 takes longer
time to attack as the number parameters in this layer are higher
compared to other layers. The parameter statistical attack needs
lesser time, as the attacker needs to overwrite the values of the
parameters to the memory only but in other attack scenarios the
attacker needs to read from the memory, do the attack operation,
then write back to the memory which leads to a longer time.
TABLE I: Accuracy across layer by layer for LeNet CNN with the
five attacks.
0.6 0.8 1.2 1.4 Random Mean Flip Swap
Conv1 97.9 99.4 99.5 98.8 89.6 4.6 31.3 87.4
Conv2 99.6 99.8 100 100 97.3 12.6 13.4 68.6
Conv3 100 100 100 100 97.3 9.8 0 50.3
FC1 100 100 100 100 99.9 2.4 0 99.9
FC2 100 100 100 100 98.8 11.6 0 100
TABLE II: Accuracy across layer by layer for AlexNet CNN with the
five attacks.
0.6 0.8 1.2 1.4 Random Mean Flip Swap
Conv1 84.8 92.5 93.0 88.1 48.3 12.9 36.8 71.5
Conv2 92.5 95.9 96.0 92.8 66.4 9.0 12.4 38.5
Conv3 98.1 99.1 98.8 99.6 66.4 13.6 13.6 34.3
Conv4 98.3 99.1 99.8 99.6 81.4 11.8 10.9 10.9
Conv5 98.4 99.3 99.8 99.6 78.8 11.3 12.6 64.4
FC6 98.4 99.4 99.5 99.5 92.9 11.8 18.0 100
FC7 98.3 99.4 99.5 99.5 93.9 16.0 3.3 100
FC8 99.8 100 99.9 99.9 92.3 14.0 0 99.6
VIII. COMPARISON WITH STATE-OF-THE-ART
Since distributed CNN is a new concept so no direct work
can be found to compare our attack techniques with oth-
ers. However, some of the existing attacks on deep learning
architecture are compared against our proposed attacks. In
[9] Hailesellasie et.al utilize a framework that analyzes the
sensitivity of weights of each respective layers and how critical
they are to the accuracy of the CNN. The sensitive weights
are then attacked during run-time to cause mis-classification.
The threat model adopted in this framework gives the attacker
access to all weights of all the layers of the CNN model. The
threat model did not consider a situation where the attacker
has partial access to the weights and has no knowledge of the
type of inputs and outputs of the CNN model. Zou et.al [19]
proposes PoTrojan which has a trigger and a payload. When
the Trojan is activated, the payload adds small neurons and
synapses to the targeted layer(s) of the CNN layers. The threat
model assumes the attacker has access to all weights of the
CNN model. The attacker can see the consequence of the attack.
Our proposed work is different since their threat model does not
consider parallel execution of CNN models on multiple devices,
where the attacker has partial access to the weights and has no
knowledge of the type of inputs and outputs of the CNN model.
Clements et.al [20] proposes an attack on neural networks
that targets the activation function of a neural network. The
threat model used in this attack assumes all weights of the CNN
model can be accessed by the attacker. The attacker can see
the impact of the attack on mis-classification of the model. The
threat model does not take into consideration parallel execution
of CNN models on multiple devices, where the attacker has
partial access to the weights and has no knowledge of the type
of inputs and outputs of the CNN model.
TABLE III: Time required to perform the attack on LeNet in (ms).
Scalar Random Mean Flip Swap
Conv1 5.117 5.338 2.767 5.485 2.044
Conv2 80.006 84.791 30.045 87.492 27.196
Conv3 1018.723 1083.635 383.760 1105.240 541.260
FC1 261.082 275.140 58.463 286.935 2.445
FC2 21.811 23.398 5.774 24.540 1.745
TABLE IV: Time required to perform the attack on AlexNet in (sec.).
Scalar Random Mean Flip Swap
Conv1 1.284 1.327 0.509 1.360 0.096
Conv2 11.425 11.978 4.646 12.211 3.935
Conv3 34.689 35.410 13.871 36.929 31.262
Conv4 25.943 26.719 10.195 27.263 23.611
Conv5 17.403 17.708 6.951 18.280 15.717
FC6 980.930 1161.937 215.432 1106.786 2.597
FC7 434.290 513.975 95.752 513.033 1.189
FC8 0.950 1.015 0.229 1.039 0.004
IX. LITERATURE REVIEW
Zhou et.al [1] proposes a framework that explores the
parallel execution of the CNN inference phase across multiple
resources constrained heterogeneous devices. The framework
uses a dynamic programming based search algorithm to com-
pute the optimal partition and parallelization of a CNN. Their
framework also proposes a CNN acceleration framework that
adaptively computes the resources and network conditions
among heterogeneous devices. Zhao et.al [11] proposes a
framework for adaptively distributing CNN inference among
resource-constrained edge node devices called DeepThings.
Their framework proposes a CNN partitioning scheme called
the Fused Tile Partitioning (FTP) method for dividing con-
volutional layers. The FTP scheme fuses convolutional layers
and partitions them in a vertical fashion while also reducing
communication overhead.
Mao et.al [6] proposes MoDNN which is a local distributed
mobile computing system for CNN over Wireless Local Area
Network (WLAN). MoDNN introduces execution parallelism
among multiple mobile devices. This system uses two partition
schemes for data delivery time between the mobile devices
based CNN layers and the different mobile computing capabil-
ities in the network. Mao et.al [6] proposes a local distributed
mobile computing system called MeDNN for CNN inference
on mobile devices. meDNN uses Greedy Two Dimensional
Partition (GTDP) and Structured Model Compact Deployment
(SMCD) used respectively to partition and deploy the CNN
on mobile devices. This system uses compression schemes
to introduce structured sparsity pruning technique to further
accelerate CNN inference. Li et.al [3] proposes Edgent which
is a co-inference framework that enables CNN partitioning to
facilitate the collaboration between edge and a mobile device
to efficiently perform CNN inference.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the security of distributed convolutional neural
networks on IoT edge devices has been explored. Five different
attacks on the values of the parameters have been studied. Some
attacks have more effect on the computational-centric layer and
other attacks have more effect on the memory-centric layer
from a classification accuracy perspective. A novel stealthy
attack implementation is discussed. All the proposed attacks
have reasonably less timing overhead. This work also indicates
to the distributed CNN designer that which of the NDs can
belong to untrusted nodes without compromising on overall
CNN security.
REFERENCES
[1] L. Zhou, H. Wen, R. Teodorescu, and D. H. Du, “Distributing deep neural
networks with containerized partitions at the edge,” in 2nd {USENIX}
Workshop on Hot Topics in Edge Computing (HotEdge 19), 2019.
[2] T. A. Odetola, K. M. Groves, and S. R. Hasan, “2l-3w: 2-level 3-
way hardware-software co-verification for the mapping of deep learning
architecture (dla) onto fpga boards,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.05944,
2019.
[3] E. Li, Z. Zhou, and X. Chen, “Edge intelligence: On-demand deep
learning model co-inference with device-edge synergy,” in Proceedings
of the 2018 Workshop on Mobile Edge Communications. ACM, 2018,
pp. 31–36.
[4] B. Guo, Z. Wang, Z. Yu, Y. Wang, N. Y. Yen, R. Huang, and X. Zhou,
“Mobile crowd sensing and computing: The review of an emerging
human-powered sensing paradigm,” ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR),
vol. 48, no. 1, p. 7, 2015.
[5] J. Mao, X. Chen, K. W. Nixon, C. Krieger, and Y. Chen, “MoDNN:
Local Distributed Mobile Computing System for Deep Neural Network,”
in Design, Automation & Test in Europe Conference & Exhibition (DATE),
2017. IEEE, 2017, pp. 1396–1401.
[6] J. Mao, Z. Yang, W. Wen, C. Wu, L. Song, K. W. Nixon, X. Chen, H. Li,
and Y. Chen, “MeDNN: A Distributed Mobile System with Enhanced
Partition and Deployment for Large-Scale DNNs,” in Proceedings of the
36th International Conference on Computer-Aided Design. IEEE Press,
2017, pp. 751–756.
[7] Y. Liu, S. Ma, Y. Aafer, W.-C. Lee, J. Zhai, W. Wang, and X. Zhang,
“Trojaning attack on neural networks,” 2017.
[8] J. Clements and Y. Lao, “Hardware trojan attacks on neural networks,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.05768, 2018.
[9] M. Hailesellasie, J. Nelson, F. Khalid, and S. R. Hasan, “Vaws: Vul-
nerability analysis of neural networks using weight sensitivity,” in 2019
IEEE 62nd International Midwest Symposium on Circuits and Systems
(MWSCAS). IEEE, 2019, pp. 650–653.
[10] Y. LeCun, L. Bottou, Y. Bengio, P. Haffner et al., “Gradient-based
learning applied to document recognition,” Proceedings of the IEEE,
vol. 86, no. 11, pp. 2278–2324, 1998.
[11] Z. Zhao, K. M. Barijough, and A. Gerstlauer, “Deepthings: Distributed
adaptive deep learning inference on resource-constrained iot edge clus-
ters,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Cir-
cuits and Systems, vol. 37, no. 11, pp. 2348–2359, 2018.
[12] S. Aldrich, Raspberry Pi 3: Complete Programming Guide with Step
by Step Raspberry Pi 3 Projects for Beginners (Python, Programming
Blueprint). CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2017.
[13] O. Hamdan, H. Shanableh, I. Zaki, A. Al-Ali, and T. Shanableh, “IoT-
based interactive dual mode smart home automation,” in International
Conference on Consumer Electronics (ICCE). IEEE, 2019, pp. 1–2.
[14] D. Pavithra and R. Balakrishnan, “IoT based monitoring and control
system for home automation,” in global conference on communication
technologies (GCCT). IEEE, 2015, pp. 169–173.
[15] V. Vujovic´ and M. Maksimovic´, “Raspberry Pi as a Sensor Web node
for home automation,” Computers & Electrical Engineering, vol. 44, pp.
153–171, 2015.
[16] A. Krizhevsky, I. Sutskever, and G. E. Hinton, “Imagenet classification
with deep convolutional neural networks,” in Advances in neural infor-
mation processing systems, 2012, pp. 1097–1105.
[17] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-Fei, “Imagenet:
A large-scale hierarchical image database,” in 2009 IEEE conference on
computer vision and pattern recognition. IEEE, 2009, pp. 248–255.
[18] T. Abtahi, C. Shea, A. Kulkarni, and T. Mohsenin, “Accelerating convolu-
tional neural network with fft on embedded hardware,” IEEE Transactions
on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems, vol. 26, no. 9, pp. 1737–
1749, 2018.
[19] M. Zou, Y. Shi, C. Wang, F. Li, W. Song, and Y. Wang, “Potrojan:
powerful neural-level trojan designs in deep learning models,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.03043, 2018.
[20] J. Clements and Y. Lao, “Hardware trojan design on neural networks,” in
2019 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS).
IEEE, 2019, pp. 1–5.
